Richard Nixon’s reputation, or what’s left of it, rests entirely on his foreign policy. Once Dallek has finished with him, he has no reputation left at all.
His partnership with Kissinger – if a relationship as competitive and dysfunctional as theirs can be called a partnership – made them probably the most famous ever American diplomatic duo. Bill Rogers – a longtime friend of Nixon’s – was given the theoretically more important role as Secretary of State, but Kissinger was the only foreign policy wonk with daily access to the President, and before long Rogers had become completely marginalised.
Of course Nixon’s presidency was defined, consumed and dominated by Watergate. What is clear to anyone who has spent any time reading about his presidency is that Watergate was just the time he got caught, not an aberration in an otherwise honest adinistration. Paranoia, dirty tricks and downright unconstitutional acts were the staple of Nixon’s political strategy. Here are just a couple of examples:
On March 30, Haldeman [White House Chief of Staff] recorded that the polls were showing “us the lowest we’ve ever been.” To combat the slump, Charles Colson [Special Counsel to the President] suggested to Nixon that they try to pay off pollster Lou Harris. “We can buy him,” Colson said.
and, discussing a strategy to deal with the leaking of the Pentagon Papers with Kissinger:
“Goddam newspapers – they’re a bunch of sluts.” Nixon told Henry, “I don’t give a goddam about repression, do you?” Neither did Henry, who said, “No.”
In the context of the history of any other presidency, these would be incredibly damning passages. In a book about Nixon’s, they are run of the mill.
His foreign policy was almost exclusively used as a tool to control domestic opposition to his administration. Little, if anything, was ever done for its own merits, or because it was the right thing to do. Everything was calculated for effect, for personal aggrandisement, for posterity.
The major foreign policy issues of Nixon’s presidency were finding a way to end the Vietnam war, and relations with the communist countries post the Sino-Soviet split. His policy in Vietnam was an ignominious failure. Far from ending the war, he and Kissinger greatly escalated it to the extent that they ordered bombed non-combatant nations like Cambodia. More than anyone else outside Cambodia, Nixon and Kissinger were responsible for creating the conditions that made the revolution that brought the Khmer Rouge to power.
In the end, the US quit Vietnam on similar terms to those on offer at the start of Nixon’s presidency, but thousands of American and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese lives were wasted in the interim. Kissinger’s role in the negotiations was murky to say the least, and his inordinate personal vanity seems to have played more of a part in his approach than his desire to find a solution to the problem that had beset the US for the previous decade.
The conventional wisdom is that Nixon used a rapprochement with China to force the USSR to the negotiating table. The reality is that he was mortally wounded politically, and needed any success he could get his hands on, even one that was pure gesture, as the meetings with Chou and Mao were. Brezhnev was perhaps equally weak at home, and arguably would have compromised anyway.
Nixon’s presidency was a near total failure, and foreign affairs were no exception. The gigantic failure in Vietnam – almost the only issue anyone cared about in the 1968 election – would be enough to tarnish even the most miraculous of achievements elsewhere. But there were none to provide a counterweight. Chile is but one example of a country plunged into years of right-wing dictatorship, in effect at the direction of the President.
Nixon and Kissinger were both profoundly unsavoury, insecure and cynical men. They would have done anything to ensure their legacy as great statesmen, even if that meant betraying promises to the country, the constitution or any notion of a morality. In the process, they ensured their everlasting ignominy.









